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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WALTER W. KERSHAW
Plaintiff-Appellant
vs.
TRACY COLLINS BANK & TRUST
Administrator of the
Estate of HALLIE LOVE
DENNIS, also known as
MRS. CHARLES F. DENNIS

Case No. 14512

Defendant-Respondent

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent believes that the court must have before
it a full exposition of the facts, which are best stated
and documented directly from Appellant's deposition (R.41).
Appellant Walter Kershaw is a retired executive of
Wheeler-Kershaw, a Caterpillar distributorship (Kershaw
deposition, page 4).

He owns

and manages income-producing

properties in several states (D.3), and he is a world
traveler (D.39,40).

|

Hallie Dennis was the widow of Earl Dennis, who died
in January,

\^72 (D.5).

Kershaw described himself as

Earlfs closed "friend, his "buddy," long-time brother Mason
and Shriner, and active fellow Presbyterian (D.6,48,49).
By Earl's will, Tracy-Collins Bank acted as trustee
for Hallie and paid to her or for her benefit whatever necessary for her support and maintenance (D.25,35).

Halliefs

personal estate consisted of her home, a $20,000 certificate
of deposit and some valuable jewelry (D.26).

Hallie main-

tained her own checking account and paid her personal
expenses from that account (D.25).
When he was in town, during the three years following
Earl's death, by his own statement Kershaw took over the
supervision of Hallie's personal life (D.7).

He chauffered

her, bought groceries, ran errands (D.15), did menial repair
work at her home (D.24), hired and fired nurses (D.ll) and
doctors (D.45), hired and directed her attorney (D.. 6,28),
occasionally reviewed her personal check book (D.33), vetoed
payments from her personal funds which she wanted to make
(D.ll), and would not allow Hallie to consider a gift to the
church of her choice (D.8,44,45).
Kershaw took over supervision of Hallie's life because
he felt that he had been "charged" by his Masonic brother,
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Earl, to Mlook after11 Earlfs widow (D.13).

Kershaw de-

scribed Hallie as follows:
She was the most demanding, cantankerous bitch
that God ever created, and she knew that her
husband, Earl Dennis, had charged me with the
responsibility of taking care of her before her
death. And she went out of her way to make it
miserable with her demands. (D.12)
When asked if he considered his services rendered
i

to Hallie as work or a job, he countered:
What do you mean I looked on it, thought it was
a job? It was a demand, a request to perform
services for her. And she made it so unbearable
that you couldn't do anything but perform the
services. (D.47)
Kershaw admitted that there was never any agreement,
written or oral, for any payment for any of his services or
mileage (D.20,21,23).

There was no writing which could be

considered as an acknowledgment of prior services (D.22).
Kershaw never asked for or demanded of Hallie during
her lifetime any compensation for any services or mileage
(D.24).

In his personal income tax returns for 1972, 1973

and 1974 he did not claim as a business deduction his expenses for mileage regarding the errands and chauffering
for Hallie (D.47,48).

Hallie never offered to pay Kershaw

for anything other than reimbursement for groceries and
medical supplies purchased by him (D.23).

She accepted the

fact that Earl had "charged" his brother Mason to "look
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after" his widow (D.12).

Kershaw did not expect any pay

or gratitude from Hallie during her lifetime.

When asked

if Hallie ever agreed to pay for his auto expenses, he
replied:
No, she didn't. She wasn't that type of a
woman. She wasn!t generous, letf s put it
that way. She was most demanding. (D.23)
Hallie died on February 7, 1975.

Kershaw filed a

claim for $6,600 with Tracy-Collins Bank, Halliefs executor.
The claim was rejected; and Kershaw sued, claiming for services rendered for and on behalf of Hallie over the threeyear period from Earl's death.

His claim was for 2,345

hours time at $2.00 per hour and 20,925 miles traveled at
12^ per mile.

The claim alleges services rendered "covering

the preservation of the estates as well as all personal care,
maintenance and supervision of all of the deceased's affairs
and operations."

(R.4)

The claim gave credit for $2,000

for receipt by Kershaw of a diamond ring by Hallie's will
and codicil, leaving a net claim of $4,600 (R.4).
Hallie's will dated January 27, 1972 (R.30) gave to
Kershaw an option to buy the diamond ring for $2,000.
Hallie instructed Kershaw and Ralph Miller, the attorney
brought in to Hallie by Kershaw (D.6), to make the codicil
dated May 2, 1974 (R.38) and thereby bequeath the ring to
Kershaw (D.17,18).

Kershaw admitted that Hallie had bequeathed
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to him the ring as compensation for services (D.19,20).
Kershaw's deposition (R.41) was taken by Respondent.
Based on the facts as shown in the deposition, Respondent
moved the District Court for Summary Judgment, which Judge
James S. Sawaya granted, stating in his memorandum decision (R.44):
I am of the opinion that the better reasoned
rule of recovery under the facts established
in this matter, is the rule urged by and supported by the authorities stated in defendant's
memoranda. I don't believe, giving plaintiff
the benefit of the facts stated in his deposition, that he is entitled to recover under any
theory of express or implied contract.
ARGUMENT
Appellant's brief limits his claim to quantum meruit,
for giving to Hallie Dennis personal care, for preserving
her estate and for supervising her affairs. Appellant does
not refute his own admission that the diamond ring was bequeathed to him by Halliefs codicil in satisfaction for
whatever services he may have rendered.
POINT I.
THE GENERAL RULE OF QUANTUM MERUIT IS ADMITTED. HOWEVER, APPELLANT DOES NOT MEET THE QUALIFICATIONS OF
THAT RULE, AS EVERY BENEFIT CONFERRED IS NOT RECOMPENSABLE, AND EVERY ENRICHMENT IS NOT UNJUST.
For recovery in quantum meruit there must be a showing
of facts of benefit accepted and unjustly conferred to imply
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a contract.

There are built-in qualifications to the gen-

eral rule of quantum meruit which spell out that; every
benefit conferred is not recompensable and every enrichment is not unjust.
The qualifications to the general rule for recovery
in quantum meruit and the parameters for the rules of implied
contracts are:
1.

Voluntary services are not compensable.
98 C.J.S 723.

2.

There must be reasonable expectation by both
parties that compensation is to be paid.
98 C.J.S. 724,735.

3.

A person who officiously confers a benefit on
another is not entitled to restitution therefor.
66 Am.Jur.2d §5,p.948.

4.

Gratuitous services are not compensable, particularly if the person rendering services
changes his mind.
17 A.L.R. 1371; 98 C.J.S.727; 8 A.L.R.2d 801.

5.

Moral obligation does not create an implied contract.
17 AmJur.2d 477.

6.

A ,ffamily-type,f or social relationship, based on
friendship and mutual concern, even where there
is no relationship by blood or marriage, creates
a presumption of rendering of services without pay.
98 C.J.S. 741, 745; 7 A.L.R. 2d 12.

The Utah Supreme Court has both recognized the general
theory of quantum meruit and has in recent Utah cases limited
restitution in quantum meruit for the reasons as above stated.
Gleason v. Salt Lake City (1937) 74 P.2d 1225, 94 U.l,
is the Utah decision uniformly referred to as the general
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statement of the rule for recovery in quantum meruit.

The

court said:
Ordinarily when services are rendered by one
person for another, and voluntarily and knowingly accepted, without more, the law will
imply a promise to pay what the services were
reasonably worth. (Emphasis ours)
In qualifying the general rule by adding "ordinarily" and
"without more," the Utah court allowed the later Utah decisions to spell out and deliniate situations which fail to
imply in fact or in law a promise or fail to cause unjust
enrichment.

Quantum meruit requires a promise to pay im-

plied in fact.

Facts negating such promise or causing an

enrichment, not unjust, disallow recovery in quantum meruit,
as there is then no implied contract in fact or in law.
We accept as basic law the general rule for recovery
in quantum meruit by implied contract, as set out in the
Gleason case.

All of the cases cited in Appellant's brief

hold that there can be an implied promise to pay.

We agree,

but to find that implied promise all of the facts must be
examined to determine the intention of both parties, as to
whether pay was expected by the renderer and to be paid by
the recipient of the services.
of the parties?

What was the relationship

Was there a relationship of friendship on

which the recipient should have been able to rely?
was the nature of the services?
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What

Were they such as both the

recipient and the renderer should reasonably expect to be
for pay, or were they normal gratuities?
The Utah Supreme Court in Burton v. McLaughlin (1950)
217 P. 2d 566, 117 U.783, decided a quantum meruit case involving personal services rendered to a decedent in his
lifetime by a neighbor by quoting and applying this test
from Williston on Contracts Rev. Ed. §36, p.94:
It is a question of fact if services are accepted
whether a reasonable man in the position of the
parties would understand that they are offered
in return for a fair compensation, or would rather
suppose either that they are offered gratuitously,
or if not, that the recipient might think so.
Intimate friends sometime render services gratuitously and how close must relationship be to make
one presumption or another applicable? The question is purely one of fact, varying in every case,
but with the burden always on the party, who
alleges a contract and seeks to enforce it, to
prove its existance.
The Utah Court in the Burton case found that the extensive nursing care rendered was not such as could possibly be
/v
expected from a neighbor as gratuity; that the rendered had
provided food and medicine for the decedent; that the decedent had admitted that she owed the renderer reimbursement;
and that these facts could make for an implied contract.
From the Kershaw deposition Judge Sawaya found abundant facts to hold that Hallie Dennis looked upon Kershaw's
acts as those of a volunteer and a friend and as gratuities;
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that she did not expect to pay for them, except by way of
the bequest of the ring; that Kershaw was a volunteer, and
that he did not expect pay for the services rendered, which
were the services normally expected of a friend; and that
those facts negated any implied contract.
POINT II.
KERSHAW1S SERVICES WERE ACCEPTED BY HALLIE AS GRATUITOUS, AND SHE DID NOT EXPECT TO PAY. KERSHAW DID NOT
EXPECT TO BE PAID, BUT CHANGED HIS MIND AFTER HER
DEATH. THESE FACTS DO NOT CREATE AN IMPLIED CONTRACT.
The Utan court in McCollum v. Clothier (1952) 241 P.2d
468, 121 U.311, cited at 98 C.J.S. 720, 724, 725 and 727,
restated the general quantum meruit rule of the Gleason case
and then added at page 470:
It is appreciated that this rule should not be
applied to bind one under implied contract who
merely permits services to be rendered him, or
accept benefits from another, under such circumstances that he may reasonably assume they
are given gratuitously. The law should not require everyone to keep on guard against such
possibilities by warning persons offering services that no pay is to be expected. It is,
therefore, essential that the court should
exercise caution in imposing the obligations of
implied contract, as contrasted to express contract, where the parties have actually defined
and agreed to the terms they are to be bound by.
With such caution in mind, the test for the
court to apply was: Under all the evidence,
were the circumstances such that the plaintiff
could reasonably assume he was to be paid and
that the defendant should have reasonably expected to pay for such services.
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Justice Wolfe wrote a concurring opinion in the
McCollum decision, page 473, where he concurred in the language in the main opinion, saying:
My comment on this wise statement is that it
appears to me that our courts have merely paid
lip service to it or ignored it altogether. It
is too easy in this state for one to surprisingly
findhimself a promisor under an implied contract.
All of us are familiar in life with instances
where a seeming volunteer ingratiates himself into
the confidence of another only to be later revealed
as a self-seeker.
The McCollum case is cited at 98 C.J.S. (Work &
Labor) 720 under the statement:
Implication of a contract to pay for services is
greatly narrowed by rules of statutory and judicial construction; the courts should exercise
caution in imposing the obligations of an implied
contract of this nature.
The same admonition is at 17 C.J.S. (Contract) 556,
again citing the McCollum case.
In Jensen v. Anderson v. Radakovitch (1970) 468 P.2d
366, 24 U.2d 191, the Utah court held that the fact that a
holder of an option to purchase a decedent's property obtained while visiting decedent and assisting him with various
chores about decedent's property without any contemporaneous
promise by decedent to pay for them was not consideration
to support the option.

The court found there was no evi-

dence to indicate that the services "were rendered at request
as a matter of business" and consequently, no contemporaneous
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promise in fact to pay for them.

The court then restated

the admonishment regarding implied promises by quoting
the language from the McCollum decision set out above.
The Jensen case is cited at 17 C.J.S. 839, §117,
under the following statement:
The authorities which speak of services rendered on request as supporting a promise must
be confined to cases where the request implies
an undertaking to pay, and do not mean that,
what was done as a mere favor can be turned
into a consideration at a later time by the
fact that it was asked for.
The above language was quoted by C.J.S. from the
Jensen opinion, page 368.
Vogl v. Goldrick's Estate (1929) 224 NW.741, 198 Wis.
500, is a case on all fours with Kershaw.

Vogl, a bank

president and long-time friend of Mr. Goldrick, performed
some manual yard work, clerical services and gave business
advice to Mrs. Goldrick, the widow living next door.

Only

after Mrs. Goldrickfs death, Vogl made a claim in quantum
meruit for eight years services.

The Wisconsin court denied

the claim, saying that the relation existing between those
parties would not raise an implied contract.

The court

added:
Claimants, silent in the lifetime, become voluble
when their pretended debtors can no longer speak.
Such claims are not favored in the law.
Let us examine the Kershaw deposition in the light of
the McCollum and Jensen decisions for facts going to establish
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or to negate an implied contract for payment of services.
Kershaw stated that he acted on Halliefs requests and that
her demands were "unreasonable" and that she was "unbearable."
We repeat Kershaw1s statements:
A. Well, I was with her every day, and she was
a gal that—well, let's just put the cards on
the table. She was the most demanding, cantankerous bitch that God ever created, and she knew
that her husband, Earl Dennis, had charged me"
with the responsibility of taking "care of her
before her death. And she went out of her way
to make it miserable with her demands. She'd
call four or five times a day and demand that I
go do this, and that, and I'd tell her, 'hire
a taxicab'. 'Well, they charge too much money.'
(D.12) (Emphasis ours)
A. What do you mean I looked on it, thought it
was a job? It was a demand, a reqiiest to perform services for her. And she made it so
unbearable that you couldn't do anything else
but perform the service. (D.47)
We submit that Kershaw's own statements prove that
the requests and demands made by Hallie certainly did not
contemplate that she would compensate him.

On the contrary,

it appears clearly that Hallie was expecting gratuitous
services from Kershaw because of their long-standing friendship and because of the known "charge" given to Kershaw by
his "buddy" and brother Mason, Earl Dennis.
Kershaw clearly stated in his deposition, pages 20,
21, 22 and 23, that he had no agreement with Hallie, or any
promise by her, for payment by her for his services in the
past or in the future.

Kershaw stated (D.47) that in his
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personal income tax returns for 1972, 1973 and 1974 he did
not take as deductions any automobile expenses, which he is
now claiming.

This clearly shows that during that period

he was not looking at his acts as any work for which he was
entitled to pay.

His services were gratuitously rendered,

and he did not expect pay at the times when rendered.
Kershaw admitted that over the period of three years
when he claimed to have rendered services for Hallie, at no
time did he ask for reimbursement or make any demand for
such.

At page 23 of the Kershaw deposition is the following

colloquy:
Q.

Did she ever agree to pay you $.12 a mile?

A.

No, she never discussed any mileage.

Q.

Did she ever agree to pay you anything for
your expenses for operating your automobile?

A.

No, she didn't. She wasn't that type of a
woman. She wasn't generous, let's put it
that way. She was most demanding.

Q.

Did you ever make any demands on her for
any of the x^ork that you had done, including
your mileage?

A.

No, I didn't make demands on her.

Q.

Was the first demand that you did make when
you filed your claim after she died?

A.

Yes,

I'll say indirectly, yes.
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POINT III.
KERSHAW WAS A VOLUNTEER. THERE WAS NO CONSIDERATION FOR HIS SERVICES. A MORAL OBLIGATION IS
NOT LEGAL CONSIDERATION.
The Utah law is clear that a moral obligation does
not make for legal consideration.
In Manwill v, Oyler (1961) 361 P.2d 177, 11 U.2d 433,
the plaintiff sued to recover payments voluntarily made by
him on defandant1s land without any consideration or adequate
promise for repayment.

Plaintiff claimed that whereas defen-

dant had been materially benefited, defendant had a moral
obligation to repay.

The Utah court held that a moral obli-

gation by itself is not sufficient to make legal considertion; that circumstances in addition to a purely moral obligation "must be such that it is reasonably to be supposed
that the promisee (plaintiff) expected to be compensated in
some way therefor11; and the Utah court cited Section 78-12144 UCA, in requiring a writing signed by the party to be
charged, as the statutory requirement to revive or establish
a prior debt or claim.

The Manwill case is cited at 17 Am.

Jur.2d 487 in support of the general rule, "that a mere
moral obligation, without anything more, is not a sufficient
consideration for an executory promise."
The general rule that a moral obligation based on
relations of friendship and good will is not matter for legal
redress is set out in Rask vs. Norman 169 N.W. 704, 141 Minn.
198, 17 A.L.R. 1296.

The Minnesota court would not allow
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recovery on the promise of one business associate to
another in his last illness to look after and protect
the business interests of the latter*s wife, which was
made on the basis of friendship and good will and was
unsupported by pecuniary or material benefit.

The gen-

eral rule is restated with many cases at the note of
8 A.L.R.2d 787.

See also 17 C.J.S. 776, §90.

Kershaw was entirely a volunteer.

He performed

whatever services he did because of an obligation he felt
toward his "buddy" and Masonic brother as shown in the
following colloquy at page 13 of the deposition:
Q.

You said that Earl Dennis had charged
you with the responsibility of taking
care of Hallie, is that correct?

A.

That's correct.

Q.

How had he done that?

A.

Because he called me over on New Year's
Day, January 1st, 1972, to tell me what
bad shape he was in physically, and he
had only a few days to live. And Hallie
didn't realize it. And he had to have
somebody to look after her until she died.

We submit that Kershaw had no obligation, legal or moral,
toward Hallie; that his services were rendered to her as a volunteer and accepted reasonably by her as gratuitous; and that
Kershaw at the time of rendering services, did not expect
compensation.

Kershaw twice dramatically denied any responsibility
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for Hallie by saying:
She was no responsibility of mine and they could
drop her in a garbage can and send her to the
city dump. (D.29,31)
POINT IV
KERSHAW ACTED OFFICIOUSLY IN IMPOSING HIMSELF ON
HALLIE. THE LAW WILL ALLOW NO RECOVERY IN QUANTUM MERUIT FOR SERVICES OFFICIOUSLY RENDERED.
The Utah Supreme Court in Baugh v. Darby (1947) P.2d
335, 112 U.l, cited at 98 C.J,S. 722, in a quantum meruit
controversy held:

"The mere fact that a person benefits

another is not of itself sufficient to require the other
to make restitution therefor,11

citing to A.L.I. Restatement

of Restitution, Sec. 2, and further:

n

Nor are services per-

formed by the plaintiff for his own advantage, and from which
the defendant benefits incidentally, recoverable," citing to
Restatement of Restitution, Sec. 40, comment C and Sec. 41
(a)(1).
A.L.I. Restatement of Restitution, Sec. 2, page 15,
provides:

"A person who officiously confers a benefit upon

another is not entitled to restitution therefor.11

Comment

(a) states:
A. Officiousness means interference in the affairs
of others not justified by the circumstances under
which the interference takes place. Policy ordinarily requires that a person who has conferred a
benefit whether by way of giving another services
or by adding to the value of his land or by paying
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his debt or even by transferring property to him
should not be permitted to require the other to
pay therefor, unless the one conferring the benefit had a valid reason for so doing. A person is
not required to deal with another unless he so
desires and, ordinarily, a person should not be
required to become an obligor unless he so desires.
The principle stated in this section is not a limitation of the general principle stated in Sec. 1;
where a person has officiously conferred a benefit
upon another, the other is enriched but is not considered to be unjustly enriched. The rule denying
restitution to officious persons has the effect of
penalizing those who thrust benefits upon others
and protecting persons who have had benefits thrust
upon them.
The following comment is at 66 AmJur.2d 948:
A basic principle underlying the rules in regard
to restitution is that a person who officiously
confers a benefit upon another is not entitled
to restitution therefor. Where a person has
officiously conferred a benefit upon another, the
other is enriched but is not considered to be unjustly enriched.
In Wooldridge v. Wareing (1951), 236 P.2d 341, 120
U.514, the Utah court in deciding another quantum meruit case,
emphasized that services must be rendered unofficiously by
one who reasonably assumes he will be compensated to recover.
The qualification of unofficious performance appears four
separate times in the Wooldridge opinion.
Oxford Dictionary shows "meddlesome" as a synonym for
"officious."

Webster's Dictionary shows "impertinent" as a

synonym, and "impertinent" is then defined as:
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"one who

meddles or intrudes in things which are not one's concern.11
We submit that the Kershaw deposition by its whole tenor,
and in the particulars hereafter shown, demonstrates that
Kershaw imposed himself on Hallie without necessity and
forced her to do his will.

He was truly a meddler.

In proof of his officiousness, we refer to Kershaw's
proudful admissions of how he took Hallie Dennis out of
the hospital, saying that this action was contrary to her
doctors' orders (D.10,11).

Kershaw claimed to have pre-

served Halliers estate by not allowing payment by Hallie of
those doctors' legitimate claims for their medical services
(D.44,45).

Kershaw was shown Hallie's last check register

(Exhibit 3, D.36) and checks issued (Exhibits 4 and 5, D.38,
41,42) and he stated that some were in the handwriting of
Hallie Dennis and some were in his printing.

He said:

"I

asked her to sign everything. She did sign everything that
I asked her to."

(D.42)

Kershaw said:

"I'd explained to

her what the charges were, and when she wanted to issue a
check for something, that was ridiculous and she did, I
wouldn't let her release the checks." (D.ll)
In explaining what he meant by his claim for "preservation of the estate," Kershaw said that he prevented Hallie
from deeding her home to the Christian Science Church (D.8).
He believed that Hallie was competent and never senile, and
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when asked what he did to prevent Hallie from deeding the
home to anyone, Kershaw answered:
A.

Just told her she couldnft sign anything,
she couldn't give it. I told the Christian
Science Church that she couldn't give that
home to them. (D.8)

Kershaw repeated that Hallie wanted to make a gift of
her home to the Christian Science Church (D.43,44).

He dis-

agreed with that church, and he stated that it was his
objection that blocked her.

At this point he stated he be-

lieved that Hallie was Msubject to being taken advantage of,
namely, by the Christian Science Church.f!

(D.44)

Kershaw's officiousness culminated in the change of
Halliefs will.

Her will of January 27, 1972 gave to Kershaw

an option to buy a certain diamond ring for $2,000.00 on
Hallie!s death.

He "ordered" Ralph Miller, Hallie!s attorney

who had been employed at the suggestion of Kershaw in 1972
(D.6), to prepare a codicil to Halliefs will (D.16,17).

The

codicil dated May 2, 1974 revoked the provision of the will
giving Kershaw the option to buy the diamond ring, and it
then bequeathed the ring to him outright (R.38).
We are sure that Kershaw did have a miserable three
years with Hallie Dennis, but as a volunteer, that was his
problem.

His services were not really necessary, Tracy-Collins
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Bank was administering the trust of Earl Dennis, primarily
for the benefit of Hallie (D.5,13,14).

She had two grand-

children, neighbors, nurses and doctors who physically cared
for her at her own expense (D.ll).
M

cateredff to Hallie (D.44).

Kershaw said that he

The change in the will was

proof positive of his officiousness and the ultimate success
of his self-ingratiation.

Justice Wolfe would have immed-

iately identified Walter Kershaw as the "seeming volunteer
who ingratiates himself into the confidence of another only
to be later revealed as a self-seeker."

McCollum v. Clothier,

supra.
POINT V.
A RELATIONSHIP BASED ON FRIENDSHIP AND MUTUAL CONCERN
PRESUMES THAT SERVICES RENDERED WERE GRATUITOUS AND
ACCEPTED AS SUCH. HALLIE BELIEVED THAT SHE WAS RECEIVING GRATUITOUS HELP FROM HER HUSBAND'S BEST FRIEND.
At 98 C.J.S. (Work & Labor) 741 is stated the general
rule that the existance of a "family" relationship between
the performer and the recipient of services raises a presumption of gratuity.
perience.

Such presmuption rests on common ex-

Blood or marriage relationship is not necessary

to create the "family" relationship, which is really based
on the mutual friendship and concern of the parties.
The lengthy annotation at 7 A.L.R.2d 12 is summarized
under the statement that:
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The view is generally taken that the element of
family relationship not only rebuts the general
implication of a promise to pay for services
rendered and accepted, but also raises an affirmative presumption which will preclude recovery
for the services unless an agreement as to compensation is established.
The Utah Supreme Court in Mathias v. Tingey (1911)
118 P.781, 39 U.561, held that services rendered by a child
are presumed to be gratuitous unless an agreement can be
shown to the contrary, thus settling in Utah the blood
family situations.
In Shields v. Eckman (1926) 248 P.122, 67 U.474, the
Utah court showed that the gratuitous presumption should not
apply in a parent-child case, where the child as provider
gave up her own home to move in with the parent, and particularly where a promise to pay for the services was proved.
Beyond blood and marriage ties, the social and fraternal relations of the parties can raise a presumption that
services are rendered without any intention or reasonable
expectation of payment, as:
Where in the case of neighbors, the social relations
of the parties and the character of the services rendered raise a presumption of gratuity, the law will
not imply a contract for compensation. 98 C.J.S. 740,
citing Vogl v. Goldrick's Estate, supra.
Payne v. Bank of America (1954) 275 P.2d 128, 128 C.A.
2d 295, was a quantum meruit suit by a business associate and
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l?

bosum friend" against the executor of his deceased friend

for giving business advice, taking his friend for walks
and drives, engaging doctors and nurses for him and generally caring for him.

The California court denied recovery,

saying at 275 P.2d 134:
If at the time the services were originally rendered they were intended to be gratuitous or as
an accomodation, motivated by friendship, kindness, or some other significant relationship
existing between the parties, and were tendered
without any expectation of remuneration, they
cannot afterwards be converted into an obligation to pay their reasonable value under the
theory of an implied contract.
There was no blood, marriage or communal family relationship in the Payne case.

It was the. fact of friendship

which negated any implied promise to pay for the type of
services rendered and accepted by the recipient and believed
by him to have been friendly acts.
The Payne case followed Smith v Riedele (1923) 213
P.281, 157 Cal. 667, where recovery in quantum meruit for personal services was denied to a non-blood "family" member,
where the recipient and the provider of services were close
friends and fishing buddies.

The California court would not

imply any agreement to pay from acts of friendship, kindness
and the close relationship between the parties, which made
the provider and the recipient occupy positions similar to
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that in a family.

Other cases denying recovery for quantum

meruit on a presumption of gratuitous nature of services
are Morton v. Angst (1918) (Calif.) 173 P. 90, 36 C.A. 644
(intimate friends); Dallman v. Frank (1905) (Calif.) 82 P. 5
1 C.A. 541 (social friends and neighbors); Kremmel v.
Schnaufer (1940) (Wash.) 103 P.2d 38, 4 Wash.2d 242 (banker
friend); and Cook v. Bryson (1928) (Calif) 265 P. 289, 89
C.A. 445 (business partners and close social friends).
Let us examine the facts as shown in the Kershaw
deposition in the light of and under the test of the Utah
Burton v. McLaughlin decision, supra.
Kershaw supervised Hallie Dennisf life because he
felt that he had been "charged11 by his Masonic brother,
Earl, to "look after" Earl's widow (D.13).

He had no under-

standing with Hallie for any compensation, and he made no
demand for pay during her lifetime (D.20-24).

His services

in driving her, running errands, helping in finding nurses
and performing menial chores, were those normally expected
of a friend.

After her death, Kershaw complained of Hallie,

saying that she was "unbearable," "a demanding, cantankerous
bitch" and that his acts were not a friendly service.
did not expect pay from her.
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He said:

He

"She wasn't that

type of woman.

She wasn't generous." (D.23)

However, he

did accept Halliefs diamond ring after her death, following the change in her will, as arranged by Kershaw (D.17-20).
Kershaw admitted that Hallie knew that Earl Dennis
had "charged" his Masonic brother to take careof Hallie (D.12).
Hallie accepted the services of Kershaw as from a friend
and a fellow member of the Presbyterian "church-family,"
believing that Kershaw was sincere in fulfilling his Masonic
obligation to protect and care for the widow of a brother
Mason.

Kershaw's services may have been time-consuming and

irritating to him, but they were really not necessary for
Hallie.

Tracy-Collins Bank, Earl's trustee, was ready al-

ways and did provide whatever necessary for her support and
welfare.

Kershaw's acts were those which should be expected

of a long-time friend, and Hallie did accept them for what
they were, namely, gratuities.
Judge Sawaya examined the facts as stated in Kershaw's
deposition, applied to them the test of the Burton v. McLaughlin
case and concluded that, giving Kershaw the full benefit of
the facts as stated, there was no way for him to recover
under any theory of express or implied contract (R.44).
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POINT VI.
KERSHAW HAS ADMITTED RECEIPT BY HIM OF THE DIAMOND RING AS PAY FOR ANY SERVICES RENDERED.
Paragraph Fifth of Hallie Dennis1 will gave to
Kershaw a first option to buy her diamond ring for $2,000
(R.31).

Hallie instructed Kershaw and Ralph Miller, her

attorney, to make the codicil dated May 2, 1974 (P.. 38)
and thereby bequeath the ring to Kershaw (D17,18).

The

codicil is silent as to any reason for the bequest.

In

his probate claim, Kershaw has given credit against the
claim of $6,600.00 for $2,000.00 for the ring as bequeathed
to him (R.4).
Appellant's brief does not refute tnat Kershaw admitted the ring having been bequeathed to him in satisfaction
for whatever services he may have rendered.

He said:

A.

Well, I don't need to believe anything.
It was her deal that she was grateful for
the services I had performed up to that
time and that the littlest she could do
was to give me that ring. Now, she was
giving it to me for services performed to
that time.

Q.

And that was as of what date?

The will, the codicil--she didnft tell me
for what time. She told me for services
rendered. There's no cutoff on the date.
The codicil, where she gives me the ring, is
May 2, 1974. (D.19)

A.
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We submit that Kershaw has been paid more than
amply through his own manipulations.
The California court in Payne v Bank of America,
supra, said at 275 P.2d 136:
A person who expects to be benefited by a
legacy cannot later resort to an action for
the reasonable value of his services where
a mere expectation is shown and neither an
express nor an implied contract to pay for
the services is established.
I\Fe submit that Kershaw should not be allowed to take
a bequest from Hallie Dennis, then turn around and collect
further from the estate of this decedent, whom he termed
an "ungrateful bitch."

CONCLUSION
The deposition of Walter Kershaw conclusively confirms
that there was no promise by Hallie Dennis in fact or implied
in fact or law to pay for any services by Kershaw.
a volunteer, and more, he was an officious meddler.

He was
Services

accepted by Hallie were believed by her to have been gratuitous because of her past friendship and that of her husband
with Kershaw.

He did not expect to be paid, beyond the be-

quest of the diamond ring, until he changed his mind after
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Halliefs death.

There is no basis for any implied contract

in quantum meruit.

The Utah case law is entirely opposed
Judge Sawaya1s decision

to any recovery for Kershaw.
should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES W. BELESS
1011 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
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